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Abstract:  Limited  energy  is  the  most  critical  constraint  that  limits  the  capabilities  of 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Most sensors operate on batteries with limited power. 
Battery recharging or replacement may be impossible. Security mechanisms that are based 
on  public  key  cryptographic  algorithms  such  as  RSA  and  digital  signatures  are 
prohibitively expensive in terms of energy consumption and storage requirements, and thus 
unsuitable  for  WSN  applications.  This  paper  proposes  a  new  fragile  watermarking 
technique to detect unauthorized alterations in WSN data streams. We propose the FWC-D 
scheme, which uses group delimiters to keep the sender and receivers synchronized and 
help them to avoid ambiguity in the event of data insertion or deletion. The watermark, 
which is computed using a hash function, is stored in the previous group in a linked-list 
fashion to ensure data freshness and mitigate replay attacks, FWC-D generates a serial 
number SN that is attached to each group to help the receiver determines how many group 
insertions  or  deletions  occurred.  Detailed  security  analysis  that  compares  the  proposed 
FWC-D scheme with SGW, one of the latest integrity schemes for WSNs, shows that 
FWC-D  is  more  robust  than  SGW.  Simulation  results  further  show  that  the  proposed 
scheme is much faster than SGW. 
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1. Introduction 
A WSN typically consists of base stations and a number of wireless sensors. Sensors are usually 
small in size, have limited computing capabilities, communicate wirelessly and are powered by small 
batteries. These sensors are often scattered in a sensor field. Data from the sensor field is collected and 
sent to a base station. The base station then sends the data to the end users for analysis and strategic 
decisions. Base stations usually have unlimited power, sufficient memory, powerful processors and a 
high bandwidth link, in comparison to other sensor nodes [‎ 1].  
WSNs are used in many fields. For example, WSNs are used in military applications for monitoring 
friendly  forces,  battlefield  surveillance,  biological  attack  detection,  troop  coordination,  and  battle 
damage  assessments.  In  environmental  applications,  sensors  can  be  used  to  detect  and  monitor 
environmental changes like tracking oil pollution.  
Data integrity is a core requirement for secure sensor data in WSN. False or malicious data would 
result in incorrect decisions and potentially financial losses. One of the major security challenges for 
WSNs is the conflict between the limited resources, e.g., computational capabilities, available power, 
and storage capacity at one hand and security requirements at the other hand. Most of the prior works 
on  securing  sensor  networks  use  traditional  security  solutions  that  are  based  on  cryptographic 
algorithms  [‎ 1-‎ 3].  These  techniques  usually  execute  thousands  or  even  millions  of  multiplication 
instructions in order to perform operations like modular exponentiation. Consequently, they are too 
expensive and not suitable for sensors [‎ 4,‎ 5]. 
A digital watermark is a lightweight technique that was used traditionally for providing copyright 
protection for multimedia data like images and video clips. Watermarking algorithms are much lighter 
and thus require less battery power and processing capabilities than cryptographic-based algorithms. 
Another advantage for the watermarking-based algorithms is that the watermark is embedded directly 
into the sensor data; there is no increase in the payload. While cryptography provides no protection 
after the content is decrypted, watermarking provides protection in secrecy at all times because the 
watermark  is  an  inseparable  constituent  part  of  the  host  media  [‎ 6-‎ 8].  The  main  idea  of  digital 
watermarking is to embed a piece of secret information (the watermark) into the data stream in such a 
way that any change or tampering with the original data would corrupt the watermark. This type of 
watermarking is called fragile watermarking, as opposed to the robust watermarking, which is used 
mainly for copyright protection [‎ 9-‎ 11]. 
This  paper  proposes  a  lightweight  simple  watermarking  scheme  to  protect  sensor  data  against 
possible malicious attacks. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
  Propose  a  lightweight  fragile  watermarking  scheme  (FWC-D)  to  provide  data  integrity  
for WSNs.  
  Provide  detailed  security  analysis  for  the  proposed  technique  and  compare  it  with  the  
SGW [‎ 12]. 
  Perform simulation experiments to measure the execution time of the proposed techniques 
and compare it with the SGW data integrity scheme. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section ‎ 2 discusses the threat and attack model 
considered  in  this paper. Section  ‎ 3 summarizes  some  of the related works in WSN security. The Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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proposed data integrity scheme is presented in Section ‎ 4. A detailed security analysis for the proposed 
technique  is  presented  in  Section  ‎ 5.  Section  ‎ 6  provides  simulation  experiments  that  measure  the 
execution cost of the proposed scheme and compares it with the execution cost of SGW data integrity 
scheme. Conclusions and future works are presented in Section ‎ 7. 
2. Threats and Attacks Model 
The nature of wireless communication makes wireless networks more vulnerable to attacks than 
wired networks. Moreover, WSNs are often deployed in uncontrolled environments, which make it 
susceptible to physical tampering. The limited computational capabilities and energy resources are 
additional challenges that need to be dealt with in designing security scheme for WSNs. The following 
are the main threats on the integrity of the WSN data [‎ 13-‎ 15]: 
Data Modification Attack: An adversary modifies the value of one or more the data readings either 
by hijacking the sender sensor or inserting itself between the sender and receivers.  
False Data Insertion: An adversary can compromise existing nodes and inject a false message with 
false information. It is also possible that the adversary add new nodes to the sensor networks that feed 
false data. Such attack also consumes the energy resources of other sensor nodes.  
Data deletion: Data deletion attack can take place by dropping individual data readings or dropping 
one or more groups and preventing them from reaching to the intended recipient. 
Denial of Service: Denial of service attacks on a wireless sensor netw ork may take on several 
forms, e.g., disrupting the radio link, misroute sensor data, or exhaust node resources. Section ‎ 5 shows 
how the proposed technique deals with each of the above attacks. 
3. Literature Review 
In  this  section  we  present  a  summary  of  the  previous  work  that  is related  to  data  integrity  in 
wireless sensor networks. Effort for securing WSNs have mainly focused on providing confidentiality 
and integrity services [‎ 16,‎ 17]. Confidentiality services protect critical data from eavesdropping by 
unauthorized  users. Confidentiality is  usually achieved by encrypting the data  using a secret  key. 
While an important part of overall security, data confidentiality is outside of the scope of this paper. In 
this paper we focus on the problem of providing data integrity in sensor networks. Data integrity 
services ensure that the received data is in the form intended by the originator and has not been altered 
in  transit.  Most  of  the  prior  works  on  securing  sensor  data  use  traditional  security  solutions  
that  are  based  on  cryptographic  algorithms  such  as  SPINS  [‎ 18],  TinySec  [‎ 19]  or  LEAP  [‎ 20].  
Cryptographic-based algorithms usually employ expensive operations like exponentiation and modular 
arithmetic of large numbers. However, because of the inherent resource limitations in wireless sensor 
nodes  cryptographic-based  algorithms  are  not  suitable  for  WSNs  applications.  In  this  paper  we  
use  a  watermarking-based  technique  for  protecting  the  integrity  of  WSNs.  The  advantage  of  
watermarking-based algorithms is that they are much lighter and require less power and processing 
capabilities than cryptographic-based algorithms.  
Digital watermarking techniques can be classified into fragile and robust. In robust watermarking 
schemes the watermark is designed such that it can stand malicious attacks like deletion, modification, Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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and  cropping.  Robust  watermarking  is  used  mainly  for  copyright  protection  [‎ 21,‎ 22].  Fragile 
watermarking embeds the watermark (secret message) into the data stream in such a way that any 
change or tampering with the original data would corrupt the watermark. This paper proposes fragile 
watermarking scheme to ensure data integrity in WSNs. 
Perrig et al. [‎ 2,‎ 18] introduced the SPINS algorithm, which consists of two security protocols: the 
Sensor  Network  Encryption  Protocol  (SNEP)  and  Micro  Timed  Efficient  Stream  Loss-tolerant 
Authentication (µ TESLA). The function of SNEP provides confidentiality (privacy), two-party data 
authentication. µ TESLA, which is an adoption of the TESLA protocol [‎ 23] provides integrity and 
freshness. µ TESLA attaches a MAC to each packet transmitted. One of the important ideas here is that 
the key used to create the MAC is not sent with the packet. In µ TESLA the base station generates a 
sequence of secret keys (one-way key chain) of length n right-to-left by repeatedly using a public 
cryptographic one-way function F. Each authentication key is part of a key chain. Each key of the key 
chain is associated with a time interval and all packets sent within one time interval are authenticated 
with the same authentication key. When a sensor node receives a packet, it cannot verify the MAC as 
the authentication key has not yet received. The receiver node stores the packets in a buffer until the 
authentication key is disclosed (based on the time schedule for disclosing keys). When the key is 
disclosed, the receiver can verify the correctness of the disclosed key. If the disclosed key is authentic, 
the node can use it to authenticate the packet stored in its buffer. Otherwise, the receiver needs to drop 
the  unsafe  packet  because  an  attacker  might  have  altered  it  during  the  transmission.  Unlike  our 
proposed method, µ TESLA cannot figure out the number of packets that are inserted or deleted by the 
attacker. µ TESLA is also vulnerable to DoS attacks; an attacker may jam key disclosure packets to 
saturate storages of sensor nodes. From the processing cost point of view, key setup is considered 
expensive and requires non-trivial memory for storing the key chain. µ TESLA also requires tight time 
synchronization which is expensive for wireless sensor networks. 
Albath  and  Madria  [‎ 24]  proposed  a  security  scheme  for  data  streams  called  PADS  to  provide 
integrity and protection against passive eavesdropping by applying confidential transmissions of data 
messages. In their scheme, a one-time pad (OTP) is computed by the sensor node using the sensor 
reading, with the secret key being shared between the sensor, base station, and MAC. The Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) is calculated and attached to the data packet in order to achieve data 
integrity.  Then  the  OTP  is  XORed  to  the  data  reading  in  order  to  provide  protection  against 
eavesdropping. One problem with PADS is that like µ TESLA it cannot determine how many packets 
are inserted or deleted. PADS also assumes that the base station and the sensors are time synchronized, 
which is too expensive for wireless sensor networks and makes it vulnerable to delay attacks. In the 
delay attack, a malicious attacker can hold a data packet for a certain period and release it later to the 
receiver. Delay attacks might be combined with inserting one or more data packets and in such a case 
the  receiver  cannot  determine  whether  the  mismatch  occurs  because  of  insertions  or  because  of 
modification attacks. 
TinySec [‎ 19] is a linked layer security protocol that provides data confidentiality, data integrity and 
data authentication. To guarantee message integrity and authenticity, TinySec computes a four-byte 
message authentication code (MAC) over the packet. The MAC would detect any tampering for the 
transmitted data. Zhu et al. [‎ 20] proposed LEAP, a key management scheme for sensor networks to 
support and restrict the security impact of nodes in the immediate neighborhood of the compromised Sensors 2011, 11                                       
 
4122 
node. LEAP uses four types of symmetric keys for each sensor node that can be used for providing 
authentication and confidentiality in WSNs. The four keys are: an individual key that is shared with 
the base station, a pair-wise key shared with another sensor node and used to send messages with the 
required privacy, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes for securing local broadcasts, 
and a group key that is shared among all the sensor nodes in the network and is used to send broadcast 
messages.  The  main  problem  with  LEAP  is  its  high  processing  and  communication  cost.  It  also 
requires nontrivial memory for storing all keys, especially when the size of the WSN increases. 
Sion et al. [‎ 22] have described a robust watermarking scheme for streaming data proposed for 
copyright protection. Streams are defined as a continuous sequence of numerical values. The technique 
identifies key points in the stream called major extremes. A set of major extremes in the group, are 
identified and selected such that these extremes will survive uniform sampling. The watermark bits are 
embedded in the major extremes. Thus, trying to destroy the watermark would leave the stream not 
useful.  The  watermark  can  be  later  extracted  and  used  to  proof  copyright  and  ownership  of  the  
data stream. 
Guo et al. [‎ 12] proposed a security scheme to provide integrity for sensor data, which is referred to 
as Sliding Group Watermark (SGW) in this paper. In SGW, the data streams are split into groups of 
variable size. The size of the group is determined adaptively as a function of the data itself. A secure 
hash function is applied for each data element in the stream and if the hash value is zero, then the data 
element is called a synchronization point (marks the end of the group). SGW scheme computes the 
secure hash function several times. First, the secure hash function is calculated at the data element 
level, then at the group level. Finally, the secure hash is computed for every two consecutive groups. 
Another problem with the SGW is that the insertion, modification, and deletion attacks may create 
confusion  at  the  receiver  side.  When  such  attacks  occur  the  receiver  may  lose  track  of  the 
synchronization points. By forming the wrong groups at the receiver side, watermark checks will fails, 
which results in rejecting authentic data readings. In [‎ 25] we proposed LWC (light-weight chained 
watermarking) scheme, which, simplifies the SGW and avoids several of its drawbacks. LWC uses 
chained watermarks; however, it is less complex than SGW. LWC provides significant performance 
improvement (one to two orders of magnitude in computational overhead over the SGW technique). 
However, LWC suffers from the same security holes that SGW has. The proposed scheme avoids the 
security  weaknesses  in  SGW  and  LWC  and  at  the  same  time  enjoys  less  computation  overhead. 
Section ‎ 5.1 presents detailed security analysis that highlight the superiority of the proposed FWC-D 
over the SGW and LWC techniques. 
Other watermarking techniques have been developed for relational databases, e.g., [‎ 1] and [‎ 21] for 
copyright protection of databases and [‎ 27,‎ 28] for data integrity protection. However, these schemes 
require that the entire database table to be available at the time of watermark embedding, thus, they are 
not suitable for streaming data [‎ 29]. 
4. The Proposed Solution FWC-D 
The goal is to develop an efficient data integrity scheme, which is fast and lightweight. FWC-D 
embeds a piece of secret information (the watermark) into the data stream in such a way that any Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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change or tampering with the original data corrupts the watermark. The proposed scheme organizes the 
sensor data readings into groups of constant sizes. 
The proposed scheme uses the hash function HASH(), which is applied to the concatenation of all 
individual data elements in the group along with the secret key K to compute the watermark. HASH() 
can be any secure hash function such as MD5 or SHA. In our implementation, we use the MD5 
(Message Digest 5) algorithm, which produces a fixed size number—128 bits (32 hex numbers). The 
watermark is embedded in the least significant bits of the data items (in our implementation the last bit 
of each data reading is ignored when computing the hash value). Thus, applications are expected to 
tolerate small distortions [‎ 1]. The watermark is stored in the previous group to make it more difficult 
for the attacker to insert or delete a complete group without detection. Since the attacker does not 
know the secret key K any modifications made to the data can be detected.  
Using the secret key, the receiver can extract the watermark (calculated at the sender side) from the 
received data. To verify the integrity of the received group, the receiver recalculates the watermark and 
checks  against  the  extracted  watermark.  If  the  two  watermarks  match,  the  group  is  considered 
authentic; in case of a mismatch, the group is reported as not authentic. The proposed scheme consists 
of three main processes: 
  Organizing data readings into groups with constant sizes.  
  Watermark generation and embedding algorithm at the sender side. 
  Watermark  extraction  and  integrity  check  algorithm,  to  check  and  verify  the  integrity  of  the 
received groups. 
In general different sensors are working independently and are not synchronized. FWC-D uses 
group delimiters to keep the sender and receiver synchronized (in recognizing the beginning and the 
end of the group) and avoids any ambiguity in case of data insertion or data deletion. The delimiter 
value D can be any value that does not occur in the data readings. For example, if the sensors measure 
atmosphere temperature, the delimiter value D can be FF hex (since atmosphere temperature cannot 
reach 128 °C ). FWC-D uses constant group sizes. Notice that using variable group size is not useful as 
the  malicious  observer  can  figure  out  the  group  size  easily  by  following  the  delimiter.  Thus  the 
proposed security scheme organizes data readings into groups of fixed size.  
 
Table 1. Notations and Parameters. 
Symbol  Description 
HASH ()  Secure hash function 
K  Secret key 
gi  The i
th group of data stream 
Si  A single reading value 
Z  The number of data readings per group 
SN  The serial number inserted in each group 
x  The size, in bit, of the serial number 
Wi  The watermark of the i
th group 
D  Group delimiter 
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FWC-D generates a serial number SN that will be attached and stored with each group. This will 
help the receiver to determine how many group insertions or deletions have occured in case of group 
insertion or deletion attacks. The watermark of group gi in FWC-D is formed by applying a secure 
hash function HASH(). Secure hash function adds a secret key K to the concatenation of the data 
elements in group gi. Thus the watermark W is formed as follows:  
Wi = HASH (K || gi || SN)  (1) 
To prevent the SN from increasing indefinitely, we limit its size to x bits. Consequently groups will 
take numbers from 0 to 2
x − 1. After SN reaches to 2
x − 1, it is reset back to 0. A set of data groups 
that are numbered from 0 to 2
x − 1 are referred to as a segment. 
The overhead of the serial number and group delimiter value is expected to be negligible when 
compared to the size of the group. For example, if the group size = 50 readings and 10 bits are used for 
the serial number SN, then the overhead is 0.2 bit/data element. Note that secure hash functions, like 
MD5, guarantees that the probability of birthday attacks and collision attacks are very low as long as 
the message size is less than 2
64. This means that, theoretically, one can use very large group sizes. 
Newer secured hash functions like SHA-160, SHA-256 and SHA-512, which allow up to 2
128. 
To thwart replay attacks and to ensure data freshness, FWC-D does not send the watermark with the 
corresponding group of data readings, but rather it embeds the watermark in the earlier group. Thus, 
the watermark Wi of group gi is sent with group gi-1 as shown in Figure 1. This way, the watermark is 
chained across all groups, making it more difficult for an attacker to copy one or more data groups and 
replay them later. This can be achieved at the expense of some additional buffer requirements at the 
sender and receiver sensors. Storing watermarks in the earlier group (Wi of group gi is sent with group 
gi-1) is referred to as forward-chaining. Alternatively, the watermark can be stored in the following 
group (Wi of group gi is sent with group gi+1) as shown in Figure 2. This setup is referred to as  
backward-chaining.  
Figure 1. Forward-chaining Watermark Embedding Process (Default). 
group gi + wi+1 group gi+1 + wi+2
Old Reading New Reading Time
… Receiver
 
Sender SN SN SN …
Watermark of group gi is 
embedded in group gi-1
Wi
Watermark of group gi+1 
is embedded in group gi
W i+1
     
       
group gi-1 + wi D D D
… …
 
Figure 2. Backward-chaining watermark embedding process. 
group gi + wi-1 group gi+1 + wi
Old Reading New Reading Time
… Receiver
 
Sender SN SN SN …
watermark of group gi-1     
is embedded in group gi
Wi-1
watermark of group gi  is 
embedded in group gi+1
Wi
     
 
 
group gi-1 + wi-2 D D D
… …
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From the security analysis point of view, forward-chaining and backward-chaining have the same 
effect on the robustness of the security scheme. The difference is in the buffer overhead at the sender 
and the receiver. In forward-chaining, the sender needs two buffers to store the current group and the 
previous  group.  At  the  receiver  end  only  one  buffer  is  needed.  On  the  other  hand,  with  
backward-chaining, where the watermark of the current group is stored in the following group the 
sender needs only one buffer, while at the receiver side two buffers are needed. 
One of the popular application scenarios is having small sensors that operate on battery power 
sending data readings to a receiver (the base station), which is a relatively powerful machine that is 
connected to a continuous power source (e.g., the wall power outlet). In this case, backward-chaining 
is preferable over the forward-chaining since the base station is more powerful and can afford to have 
a large buffer size.  
The group size Z is a design parameter and it depends on the capability of the sensors used. There is 
a trade off in selecting the group size Z. The use of small group increases the distortion introduced to 
the each data reading and the payload overhead. On the other hand, a large group size requires a larger 
buffer to store the data elements of the group and it increases the watermark computation time.  
The  group  size  is  determined  by  the  application  and  the  power  of  available  sensors.  Some 
applications use high end sensors that are connected to permanent power supplies (e.g., work on wall 
power) and equipped with powerful CPUs and large amounts of memory. In such cases a large group 
size is useful as it minimizes the overhead and increases the probability of attack detection. On the 
other hand, in the case of small and weak sensors where computing and power capabilities are very 
limited,  a  smaller  group  size  is  desirable.  Furthermore,  if  the  application  requires  a  high  rate  of 
transmission then the latency should be small and consequently a small group size should used. 
4.1. FWC-D Embedding Algorithm 
The sender keeps buffering data readings until one complete group, say gi of size Z, is formed. The 
watermark Wi of group gi is computed using the secure hash function HASH(), which is applied to the 
concatenation of all individual data readings in the group along with secret key K and group serial 
number  SN.  In the following  discussions  we assume  a forward-chaining  watermarking scheme  in 
which the watermark is stored in the earlier group of data. Thus, the sender has to buffer two groups of 
data readings, say gi and gi+1. The sender computes Wi+1 the watermark of gi+1 and embeds it in gi by 
replacing the least significant bits in the data readings. Once the watermark is embedded, group gi is 
sent along with the serial number SN and group delimiter D to the receiver. 
Like  other  watermarking  techniques  that  are  based  on  least  significant  bit  replacement,  the 
underlying application should be able to tolerate small distortions introduced to the data readings. By 
replacing the least significant bits, the values of data reading might change by one. If two bits are 
replaced, the value of the data readings might change by up to three. The size of the watermark (in 
terms of the number of bit) is constant and it depends on the secure hashing function. In the case of 
MD5 it is 128 bits. Thus if the group size Z = 128, then each bit from Wi can be placed in one data 
reading in the group. If the size of Wi is smaller than the group size Z, then at most one bit per data 
reading is replaced. In this case, the data readings that will carry the bits of Wi can be selected carefully 
(in  agreement  with  the  receiver)  to  make  it  harder  on  the  attacker  to  figure  out  the  watermark. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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However, if Wi is larger than Z then one possibility is to store more than one bit of Wi per data reading. 
However,  the  distortion  introduced  to  the  data  reading  increases  with  increasing  number  of  bits 
replaced.  Note  that  using  part  of  the  hash  value  as  a  watermark  might  compromise  the  security 
guarantee of the secure hash function. In this case it is better to use larger group size to provide the 
required security guarantees.  
4.2. FWC-D Detection Algorithm 
The receiver keeps buffering data readings as they arrive until the group delimiter is encountered. 
To  make  sure  that  the  data  are  integral  and  have  not  been  altered,  the  receiver  reconstructs  the 
watermark by calculating the hash value of each group it receives and compares it with the watermark 
(hash calculated at the sender side) sent by the receiver. If the two hash values match, the data readings 
are considered integral and they are accepted by the receiver.  
Remember that because we are assuming forward-chaining, the watermark Wi+1 of group gi+1 is 
sent with the group gi as shown in Figure 3. Thus when the sender receives group gi, it extracts Wi+1 
and buffers it until group gi+1 arrives. The receiver sensor should have enough storage to buffer one 
data group and the watermark of the following group. Upon the arrival of all data readings that belong 
to  group  gi+1,  the  watermark  of  group  gi+1  is  then  reconstructed  by  applying  HASH()  to  the 
concatenation of all individual data readings in the group gi+1 along with secret key K and group serial 
number SN. Then the reconstructed watermark is checked against the extracted watermark from group 
gi. If the two watermarks match, the data readings of gi+1 are accepted and otherwise they are rejected. 
Figure 3. Data Modification Attack in Forward-chaining Watermarking Scheme. 
group gi + wi+1 group gi+1 + wi+2 SN SN SN
   
group gi-1 + wi D D D
Group gi is modified
X
     
… …
   
 
 
In addition, the receiver checks the serial number of the received group to check for deleted or 
inserted groups. Section ‎ 5 discusses in more detail how the receiver can detect various types of attacks.  
5. Security Analysis of the FWC-D Scheme 
An attack is considered successful if it is not detected by the receiver. In this section we discuss 
various types of attacks that can be lunched in the wireless sensor network scenario and how the 
proposed security scheme can be used to thwart these attacks.  
 
Data Modification: Let us assume that the attacker has altered the content of group gi. Note that 
alteration might affect one or more of the group gi constituents, e.g., the value of one or more of the 
data elements of the group, the serial number, the delimiter, or even the watermark of group gi-1. Next 
we will briefly discuss each of these scenarios.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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The first scenario is the case where modification affects the least significant bits of group gi. Recall 
that the least significant bits of group gi contain the Wi-1 (watermark of the gi+1 group). At the receiver 
end, the integrity check of group gi+1 will fail, even though the attacker has not altered group gi+1, and 
thus, group gi+1 will be rejected by the receiver. On the other hand, the integrity check for group gi 
succeeds because the calculated hash value matches the extracted watermark Wi that was shipped with 
group gi-1 (note that the least significant bit of the data readings is not included in the watermark 
calculation). As a result, the receiver will accept group gi.  
In the second scenario, we assume that the attack altered the value of one or more data readings 
from group gi. Further we assume that the attack does not change the least significant bits. As a result, 
the receiver will reject group gi because the calculated watermark does not match the one sent by the 
receiver. At the same time, since the least significant bits of the group gi (that contains the watermark 
of group gi+1) are integral, thus, the receiver will consider gi+1 authentic and accept it. If the attacker 
changes both the data and the least significant bits of group gi (Wi+1) as a result, the integrity check of 
groups gi and gi+1 will fail and the receiver will reject both groups. 
In the third scenario, the modification attack only affects the group serial number SN. Since the 
group serial number is included in the watermark computation, the integrity check of the victim group 
will fail. As a result, the receiver will reject group gi. But since the least significant bits of group gi 
have not been affected, so the receiver accepts gi+1. 
In the fourth scenario, the modification affects the group delimiter only. The receiver will continue 
reading until it encounters the delimiter of the gi+1 group. In this case the receiver will consider groups 
gi and gi+1 as one group, but since the group size is greater than the agreed upon group size Z, the 
receiver will reject groups gi and gi+1. Moreover, because of the chained watermark, the receiver will 
not be able to check the integrity of the group gi+2. The receiver should be able to read and authenticate 
the group gi+3 and the later groups.  
The above attack scenarios are independent and thus if two or more of the above scenarios occur 
together, the security analysis is this case can be easily derived from the above discussions. 
 
Data Element Insertion Attack: Since the group size is constant, the receiver expects to receive 
exactly Z elements before encountering the group delimiter D. In case of data element insertion, the 
receiver will realize that one or more data elements have been inserted. Of course, the receiver will 
then reject group gi as there is no way to identify the false data reading. Now, since Wi+1 (watermark of 
group gi+1) is stored in group gi the receiver will extract an incorrect Wi+1 and as a result rejects gi+1. 
The following group, gi+2, should not be affected as the receiver can extract Wi+2 correctly from gi+1. 
Group gi+2 will match its watermark Wi+2 and it will be accepted. The group gi+3 and later groups will 
not be affected. 
 
Data Element Deletion Attack: In this analysis, we assume that the attacker has deleted one or 
more data readings from the group gi. There are two scenarios depending on whether the deleted object 
was data reading or delimiter D: 
Scenario 1: the deleted data does not include the group delimiter D. The receiver can detect that the 
number of received data elements is less than the group size. As a result, the receiver will reject group Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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gi and gi+1 will also be rejected because Wi+1 is stored in group gi; the receiver will not be able to check 
the integrity of group gi+1. However, since group gi+1 has not been altered, group gi+2 will match its 
watermark Wi+2 and it will be accepted. 
Scenario 2: we look at the possibility that the deleted data elements include the group delimiter D. 
In this case the receiver will not detect the end of group gi and consequently join groups gi and gi+1. As 
a result, the receiver will reject both of them. Moreover, since Wi+2 (the watermark of group gi+2) is 
stored in group gi+1 the receiver will not be able to verify the integrity of group gi+2 and therefore will 
reject gi+2. However, since group gi+2 is not altered, then group gi+3 will match its watermark Wi+3 (that 
was sent with group gi+2) and thus gi+3 and the following groups will be accepted. 
In  general  if  the  attack  affects  f  delimiters  where  f  >=  2,  f  +  1  groups  will  be  rejected  by  
the receiver. 
 
Group Insertion Attack: In this analysis, we assume that the attacker has managed to insert two 
groups, gX1 and gX2 (shown in dotted lines in Figure 4) between group gi and gi+1. Moreover, let us 
also assume that the inserted groups have the correct group size and group delimiter. At the receiver 
end, the integrity of group gi is already checked. Since the attacker does not have the secret key K, 
which is known only to the sender and receivers, the reconstructed watermark of group gX1 will not 
match the extracted watermark from group gi. Note that the receiver will follow the usual procedure 
and extract the watermark for gX1 from the least significant bits of gi. Moreover, the reconstructed 
watermark of group gX2 will not match the extracted watermark from group gX1. The attacker can 
generate a hash value for gX2 but because the attacker does not know the secret key K, he cannot 
generate the correct watermark. The insertion of the groups, gX1 and gX2, will affect the integrity 
verification of group gi+1. Thus the receiver will reject group gi+1. When group gi+2 is formed, the 
reconstructed watermark of group gi+2 will match the extracted watermark from group gi+1 and thus the 
receiver will accept group gi+2 as well as later groups of data. The successful integrity verification of 
group gi+2 will confirm that there are at least two groups that have been inserted between group gi and 
gi+2  that  have  been  inserted.  Remember  that  the  receiver  keeps  track  of  the  last  serial  number  it 
receives. As a result, the receiver will reject groups gX1 , gX2 and gi+1 and accept group gi+2 and the 
later groups. 
Figure 4. How FWC-D resists Groups Insertion Attack. 
Inserted fake groups gX1 and gX2
group gX1 group gi+1 group gi group gX2
 
group gi+2
         
… Receiver Sender …
   
 
Group Deletion Attack: To make the description easier we show an example in which three groups 
have been deleted. The analysis can be generalized to describe the case of deleting and number of 
groups. Let us assume that the group gi, gi+1, and gi+2 have been deleted by the attacker (see Figure 5). 
Note that the deletion of group gi+2 will also affect the integrity verification of group gi+3 since Wi+3 is 
stored in group gi+2. At the receiver end, we assume that the integrity of group gi-1 is already verified. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Since gi, gi+1, and gi+2 have been deleted the receiver gets gi+3 right after gi-1. Then the receiver goes 
ahead  as  usual  and  computes  the  watermark  of  group  gi+3  and  compares  it  with  the  watermark 
extracted from the previous group gi-1. The reconstructed watermark of group gi+3 will definitely not 
match the extracted watermark from group gi-1. The receiver will consider group gi+3 as unauthentic 
and reject its data readings. The receiver also extracts the watermark Wi+4 from gi+3 and stores it in the 
memory until the following group arrives (in this case gi+4). When group gi+4 is formed, the computed 
watermark of group gi+4 will match the extracted watermark from group gi+3 and thus the receiver will 
accept group gi+4 as authentic. The successful integrity verification of group gi+4 will confirm that 
groups gi, gi+1 and gi+2 have been deleted. As a result, the receiver rejects group gi+3 and accepts  
group gi+4. 
Figure 5. Group Deletion Attack. 
groups gi , gi+1 and gi+2 are deleted
group gi+3 group gi-1 group gi+2
 
group gi+4
       
… Receiver Sender …
 
group gi+1 group gi X X X
   
 
 
Segment Deletion Attack: Recall the segment refers to a set of successive groups, which have 
serial numbers, SN, from 0 to 2
x −1. Here we assume that the attacker has managed to delete 2
x − 1 
successive groups as shown in Figure 6. In this case the receiver will see an ordered serial number SN 
in spite of the deletion attack. Let us assume, for example, that the receiver sees group gi-1, which 
belongs to segment A followed by the group gj, which belongs to segment B. At this point, the receiver 
detects a mismatch between the reconstructed watermark for group gj and Wj (the watermark that is 
extracted from group gi-1). However, the receiver would not know if the mismatch is caused by a 
modification attack or a deletion of multiple groups, thus the receiver will reject gj even though the 
receiver will not know how many segments has been deleted. However, the receiver recovers from the 
attack, since the later group gj is not altered, so group gj+1, which belongs to segment B will match its 
watermark Wj+1 with the one extracted from group gj. Thus, the receiver will accept group gj+1, which 
belong to segment B as authentic. The following groups are unaffected by the attack and will be 
processed as usual. 
Figure 6. FWC-D: Segment Deletion Attack Scenario. 
1 gi-1  D 2 D gi 3 D gi+1 2
x-1D …
        …
Segment A
1
 
gj-1 D 2 D gj 3 D gj+1 D …
  …
     
Segment B
dropped
 
2
x-1
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5.1. Comparison with the SGW Watermarking Schemes 
The main limitation of SGW [‎ 12] is that under some insertion, modification, and deletion attack 
conditions  the  receiver  loses  track  of  the  synchronization  points.  We  recall  that  in  SGW,  the 
synchronization points are used to mark the end of the groups. Therefore, the receiver will not be able 
to construct the group correctly. Consequently it will compute the wrong watermark and reject data 
readings. The problem is that this confusion will continue forever. This means that one attack can 
cause all the following data readings to be rejected by the receiver and it never recovers.  
Recall that SGW uses variable group size, which depends on the value of data readings. SGW 
calculates the hash of each data reading. Data reading is considered a synchronization point if: 
1.  The modulus of its hash equal to zero and  
2.  The group has already more than L data readings,  
where L is a predefined threshold. Note that because of the second condition there might be data 
readings inside the group that fulfill the first condition but they are not considered synchronization 
points by the sender sensor. If the same data readings arrive at the receiver side (without alteration), 
the receiver will apply the same two conditions and gets the same set of synchronization points and 
consequently the same group structure. The problem arises when the group is altered by an insertion, 
deletion, or even modification attack. The receiver, in this case, may choose synchronization points 
that are different than those chosen by the sender sensor. This will cause the receiver to form groups 
that are different than those formed at the sender and the integrity checks fail. The following example 
will explain this point further. 
For example, if the attacker modifies the last data element in group gi, which is the synchronization 
point of the group, the modified data elements may become a non-synchronization point. Figure 7 
shows five groups of data readings formed according to SGW technique.  
Figure 7. Group formation in SGW watermarking technique. 
… Sender Receiver …
group gi-2 group gi-1 group gi group gi+1 group gi+2
Synchronization point identified by the sender Data element  
 
The modified data reading is marked by X in the figure. In this case we have two possibilities (in 
this example we consider the minimum group size L = 4):  
  If no element from gi+1 satisfies the first condition for the synchronization point, group gi is 
combined with group gi+1. Note that the second condition for the synchronization point will be 
satisfied after adding at most one new element to gi.  
  If there is at least one element from gi+1 that satisfies the first condition for the synchronization point 
(shown as a gray oval in Figure 8), the receiver will continue adding data readings (from group gi+1) 
to gi until reaching that element, which will serve as a new synchronization point for gi.  
Moreover, the size of group gi+1 might fall below L, so in order to meet the second condition above, 
the receiver will add data readings (from group gi+2) to gi+1 to complete at least L data readings in 
group gi+1. In Figure 8 the dotted line shows the new groups formed at the receiver side (receiver view Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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of the groups), while the solid line shows the sender view of the groups. Unfortunately, this confusion 
in forming groups at the receiver side might continue forever.  
 
Figure 8. SGW watermarking technique is vulnerable to confusion in forming the groups 
at the receiver. 
 
 
Note that even if the modified data reading is not the synchronization point, the new value of the 
attacked data element might make it a synchronization point. So the receiver would end the current 
group  incorrectly  and  group  miss-synchronization  continues.  It  can  be  easily  shown  that  similar 
scenarios may arise under insertion and deletion attacks but these are not discussed because of the 
space limitation.  
6. Performance Evaluation 
We  have  performed  experiments  to  measure  the  performance  and  overhead  of  the  proposed 
watermarking scheme and compare it with the SGW [‎ 12]. Experiments were performed using synthetic 
data streams. Section ‎ 6.1 evaluates the performance of the embedding algorithm at the sender sensor 
while Section ‎ 6.2 show the performance of the watermark extraction and integrity check algorithms at 
the  receiver  sensor.  We  used  Java  JDK  6,  Eclipse  Platform  Version:  3.3.1.1  to  implement  all 
algorithms  and  the  simulation  environment.  All  experiments  were  conducted  on  an  Intel  Pentium 
processor system at 1.86 GHz, with 512 MB of memory and using the Windows XP operating system. 
6.1. Performance Evaluation of the FWC-D Scheme 
We calculate the watermark and embed it in one group of data. The average embedding response 
time is calculated over 30 groups. The first experiment compares the average embedding time of the 
proposed  FWC-D  scheme  is  compared  with  the  SGW  scheme  [‎ 12].  In  Figure  9(a)  the  Y-axis 
represents the average embedding response time as the data arrives at the sensor side, while the X-axis 
represents the window size. We changed the group size from 50 to 1,000 readings. The figure shows 
that on the average SGW is about 59 times slower than FWC-D. The gain in the performance increases 
with increasing the window size. However, the difference in the performance is not clear in the linear 
scale when the group sizes are small. Figure 9(b) shows the same experiments on a semi-logarithmic 
scale to highlight the performance gain when the group sizes are small. 
Figure  10  shows  the  accumulated  execution  time  of  the  watermark  generation  and  embedding 
algorithms for the proposed FWC-D scheme compared to the SGW scheme. The group size Z is set  
to 200. The accumulated execution time of the FWC-D algorithm is the total time used for performing 
the following operations: constructing the data group, generating and attaching the group delimiter D Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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serial  number  SN  at  the  end  of  each  group,  watermark  computation  of  embedding  the  computed 
watermark.  
Figure 9. Execution time of the Embedding algorithm at the sender Side. (a) Linear Scale, 
(b) Logarithmic Scale. 
 
         
(a)               (b) 
Figure  10. Accumulated execution time of the Embedding algorithm. (a) Linear Scale  
(b) Logarithmic Scale. 
      
(a)             (b)  
The importance of the accumulated execution time is that it gives an indication of the expected 
power consumption at the sensor. The Y-axis represents the accumulated processing time as the data 
arrives and the X-axis represents that number of data readings sent since the start of the simulation. 
From the figure, one notices that as the data stream size increases the accumulated execution time of 
the SGW scheme increases, however, FWC-D scheme at a much lower rate. This means that the power 
requirement for FWC-D is much less than the power required for executing the SGW scheme and thus, 
due to resource constraints in WSNs, the FWC-D technique is more suitable for WSNs. 
6.2. FWC-D Watermark Extraction and Integrity Check Algorithm 
The execution time of the watermark extraction and integrity check is calculated and averaged  
over 30 groups. Figure 11 shows the average extraction and integrity check response time in the y-axis. 
The X-axis represents the window size. The group size Z is varied from 50 to 1,000 data readings. 
Figure 11(a) shows the average execution time on linear scale. To show the performance gain at small 
window sizes, Figure 11(b) shows the average execution time in logarithmic scale. The results show 
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that the proposed watermarking technique is much faster than that of SGW. It also shows that the gain 
in the performance increases with increasing the window size. The figure shows that the FWC-D 
average extraction and integrity check response time at window size 1,000 is about 39 times faster than 
that required by SGW. Thus FWC-D significantly improves WSN response time. 
Figure 11. Execution time of the Integrity check algorithm at the receiver side. (a) Linear 
Scale, (b) Logarithmic Scale. 
 
    
(a)             (b) 
The  experiments  in  Figure  12(a)  show  the  accumulated  execution  time  of  the  watermarking 
extraction and integrity check algorithms. The Y-axis represents the accumulated processing time and 
the X-axis represents the number of data readings processed since the start of reception. Recall that we 
use the accumulated execution time as an indication of the expected power consumption at the sensor. 
The group size Z is set to 200. The FWC-D algorithm includes the following operations: constructing 
the data groups, generating and attaching the group delimiter D and serial number SN at the end of 
each window, watermark computation of group gi, extracting the embedded watermark from group gi-1, 
and comparing the extracted watermark against the reconstructed watermark. The results show that 
cost of the FWC-D is about 34 times less than the cost required by SGW.  
Figure 12. Accumulated execution time of the Integrity check algorithm at the receiver 
sensor. (a) Linear Scale (b) Logarithmic Scale. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Works 
We have proposed FWC-D, a lightweight algorithm that uses a digital watermarking technique to 
provide data integrity for wireless sensor networks. FWC-D organizes data readings in groups with 
constant sizes and links group with each other by storing the watermark of the group in the following 
group. The watermark of group gi in FWC-D is formed using the hash function HASH(), which is 
applied to the concatenation of all data elements in group gi along with a secret key K, known only to 
the sender and receivers, and a group serial number SN. The watermark is stored in the least significant 
bits of the data readings in of group gi-1. FWC-D uses a group delimiter to keep the sender and receiver 
synchronized and avoids any ambiguity in case of data insertion or data deletion. The delimiter value 
D can take any value that does not occur in the data stream. In addition to the group delimiter D,  
FWC-D generates a serial number SN that will be attached and stored with each group and this will 
help the receiver determine how many group insertions or deletions occur in case of group insertion or 
deletion attacks.  
We have provided a detailed security analysis for the proposed techniques and compared it with 
relevant prior works. We have also evaluated the cost, in terms of the execution time, of the proposed 
watermarking scheme and compared it with the execution time of the SGW one [‎ 12]. The experiments 
showed that the proposed schemes have much less computational overhead (one to two orders of 
magnitude less compared to the SGW scheme) and thus, can significantly improve the WSN lifetime. 
In  the  future,  we  plan  to  study  semi  fragile  watermarking,  which  tolerates  non-significant  small 
changes,  possibly  caused  by  communication  interference,  but  detect  significant  changes  due  to 
unauthorized alteration. 
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